DEFENCE FORCE DISCIPLINE APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Wethling v Chief of Army (No 2) [2007] ADFDAT 3
Held:
1. Lie relevant to the credibility of the appellant but not to be used as an implied admission of guilt of the forgery: appeal on these grounds allowed.
2. Appeal otherwise dismissed.
3. No retrial
Criminal Code (Cth) ss 11.2, 144.1 and 145.1
Criminal Code (Qld), s 568(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 586(4)
Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 applied
Harris v The Queen (1990) 55 SASR 321 referred to
R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 referred to
R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 cited
R v Webb (1992) 59 SASR 563 cited
Gilson v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 353 cited
M v R (unreported; SA Court of Criminal Appeal; 18 August 1993) cited
Credland v Knowler (1951), 35 Cr App R 48 cited
Tripodi v The Queen (1961), 104 CLR 1 cited
Reg v Buck (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 cited
Reg v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 cited
R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344 cited
People v Showers (1968) 440 P 2d 939 cited
Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441
R v Lucas [1981]QB 720 cited
BRYAN DAVID WETHLING v CHIEF OF ARMY (No 2)
DFDAT 3 OF 2006
HEEREY J (PRESIDENT), MILDREN & DUGGAN JJ (Members)
10 SEPTEMBER 2007
MELBOURNE
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IN THE defence force discipline appeal tribunal |
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DFDAT3 OF 2006 |
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ON APPEAL FROM a defence force magistrate |
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BETWEEN: |
BRYAN DAVID WETHLING Appellant
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AND: |
CHIEF OF ARMY Respondent
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MEMBERS: |
HEEREY J (PRESIDENT), MILDREN & DUGGAN JJ (MEMBERS) |
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DATE OF ORDER: |
10 SEPTEMBER 2007 |
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WHERE MADE: |
MELBOURNE |
THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed
2. The convictions and punishment be quashed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
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IN THE defence force discipline appeal tribunal |
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DFDAT 3 OF 2006 |
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ON APPEAL FROM A Defence Force Magistrate |
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BETWEEN: |
BRYAN DAVID WETHLING Appellant
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AND: |
CHIEF OF ARMY Respondent
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MEMBERS: |
HEEREY J (PRESIDENT), MILDREN & DUGGAN JJ (MEMBERS) |
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DATE: |
10 SEPTEMBER 2007 |
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PLACE: |
MELBOURNE |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 The appellant was convicted after a trial by a Defence Force Magistrate (DFM) of the offences of forgery and using a forged document contrary to ss 144.1 and 145.1 respectively of the Criminal Code (Cth).
2 At the time of the alleged offences the appellant was the Squadron Sergeant Major of 1 Squadron, The Pilbara Regiment. He held the rank of Warrant Officer Class 2. Upon conviction he was reduced to the rank of Sergeant.
3 The appellant appealed against the convictions on grounds which included claims that the DFM erred in finding that the appellant told a lie out of a consciousness of guilt and that the convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
4 The charges arose out of an application by the appellant to take long service leave which he had accrued. Although he was entitled to the leave, it was necessary for him to obtain permission to take leave at the time requested in the application for leave.
5 In May 2002 the appellant was contemplating leaving the Army and taking up civilian employment. He made some enquiries about applying for various franchises and eventually spoke to Major Simpkins, the Officer Commanding, 1 Squadron about applying for leave in order to further investigate his prospects of post-retirement employment.
6 According to Major Simpkins, he had a number of conversations with the appellant on this topic. The appellant told Major Simpkins that he had a particular interest in a franchise with Bakers Delight which operates a franchise baker business. Major Simpkins said that during one of these conversations the appellant said “I’ve got the Bakers Delight franchise”. The appellant also told him that he had to undertake two courses in preparation for the franchise.
7 The appellant filled out an application for leave form and submitted it to Major Simpkins who forwarded it to the Commanding Officer (the CO) with a Minute dated 30 May 2002 in which he stated that he supported the application for leave.
8 When the CO received the documentation he told Major Simpkins that the wrong application form had been used. He advised that he did not have authority to approve the leave and could only recommend the granting of leave to Land Command Headquarters. He told Major Simpkins that more information would be required in support of the application. Major Simpkins said in evidence that on 17 June 2002 he told the appellant to provide some documentation from Bakers Delight to establish that the appellant had been successful in obtaining a franchise. He said the appellant replied “The letter’s coming, it’s in the mail”.
9 Major Simpkins said that he later received an envelope delivered to him by Corporal Greene who was the appellant’s partner. She also was a member of the Pilbara Regiment at the time.
10 Major Simpkins said there was a letter in the envelope which was written on Bakers Delight notepaper. He produced the letter (exhibit 4) dated 23 May 2002 which was addressed to the appellant and purportedly signed by a Tania Darchi (sic), Recruitment Officer for Bakers Delight. The letter congratulated the appellant on his “successful application to join Bakers Delight Franchise” and outlined the training which it was necessary for him to complete.
11 It was the prosecution case that the letter was forged and that it falsely stated that the appellant had been successful in obtaining a franchise. Ms Tania Louisa de Marchi, who was at the time of the events a recruitment consultant with Bakers Delight, denied that she had written the letter. Ms Laura Jane Opray, an assistant in recruitment at Bakers Delight working for Ms de Marchi, said that on 13 May 2002 she received a telephone call from a person identifying himself as Bryan Wethling who said he was interested in becoming a franchisee. She said that on the day he made the enquiry she sent him a standard form letter noting his application and forwarding to him an application form and information concerning franchises. This letter became exhibit 7. She said there was no further communication with the appellant.
12 The appellant said in evidence that he contacted Bakers Delight prior to talking to Major Simpkins about leave. He denied that on an occasion in May 2002 he told Major Simpkins “I’ve got it”, referring to a franchise with Bakers Delight. According to his version, he told Major Simpkins that he had simply received information packages from Bakers Delight and Brumby’s, another franchisor of bread outlets.
13 The appellant said that on 17 June 2002 Major Simpkins asked him about dates relevant to the Bakers Delight franchise and where his training was to take place. He said he answered that there were no firm dates for training. He said he added:
“I’m still doing some groundwork at this stage. That’s why I asked for long service leave.”
14 The appellant produced a diary to refresh his memory concerning this conversation. The diary entry also records that Major Simpkins asked the appellant for a letter from Bakers Delight. The appellant said he replied:
“I’ve got no information to say that I have been successful with the franchise. The only information I’ve got is the four letters that I have received from the different franchises.”
15 The appellant said that on the evening of this conversation with Major Simpkins he asked Corporal Greene to go to Major Simpkins’ office the following morning and deliver the letter which he had received from Bakers Delight. This was the letter which accompanied the information package. He denied any knowledge of the letter which Major Simpkins said he received and which purported to offer the appellant a franchise.
16 Corporal Greene was called by the defence. She said she took a letter which the appellant had received from Bakers Delight to Major Simpkins’ office on the morning of 18 June 2002. She said it looked like exhibit 7. Corporal Greene also denied any knowledge of a letter which purported to offer the appellant a franchise.
17 The DFM found that exhibit 4 is a false document. He said he accepted the evidence of employees of Bakers Delight that this was the case. As to the conversations between the appellant and Major Simpkins, the DFM accepted the evidence of Major Simpkins where it conflicted with the evidence of the appellant. He found beyond reasonable doubt that the letter which was given to Major Simpkins by Corporal Greene was the false letter exhibit 4. He found that this could only have occurred with the appellant’s complicity. He continued:
“On the evidence I cannot be satisfied as to precisely what respective roles WO Wethling and CPL Greene played in the making of exhibit 4. However, I am satisfied that the accused either made the false letter himself, or that he aided CPL Greene to do so, by providing her with the information that was falsely inserted into the document. I am further satisfied that the accused either procured the use of the document by CPL Greene’s complicit involvement with its delivery to MAJ Simpkins, or that he used the document by providing it to CPL Greene, who acted innocently.”
18 The DFM went on to find that the offences of forgery and using a forged document had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
19 The main ground of appeal relates to a document, exhibit 15, which was tendered by the defence. The exhibit is a copy of a Minute from the appellant to Major Simpkins dated 15 June 2002. The Minute states that the appellant was making enquiries concerning four franchises including Bakers Delight and Brumby’s. Details relating to some of the franchises are referred to in the Minute which continues as follows:
“Of those franchises no dates all (sic) training courses have been discuss (sic) in great detail. The only information I have received from Bakers Delight and Brumby’s was some information about the franchising and Introduction Package. I have also received enquiry letters from Jim’s Mowing and Kwik Kerb.”
20 The appellant said in evidence that the Minute was on a disc on which he kept backup material from his posting with the Pilbara Regiment. He said he included the letter in material placed on Major Simpkins’ desk with his first application for leave. Major Simpkins denied the appellant’s assertion that the document was given to him. If the letter had been given to Major Simpkins on or about 15 June it would have supported the appellant’s version that he did not tell Major Simpkins he had been offered a franchise.
21 The prosecuting officer placed considerable reliance on the production of this Minute. In his final address he said:
“He [the appellant] refused to stake his reputation on his evidence that that was the fact, that is was created when he said it was, on 14 June 2002. There is only one reason why he would be prepared to lie about that, and that is to assist him in this case. There is no doubt, in my submission, that that lie is corroborative of his guilt, in the sense that the High Court contemplated in Edwards v R. That, in my submission, is the most overwhelming and powerful evidence that supports the guilt of WO Wethling on the charges.”
22 The DFM stated in his reasons for decision that the appellant was seriously discredited in cross-examination, particularly in relation to exhibit 15. He made the following finding:
“I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of MAJ Simpkins’ evidence, and the cross-examination of WO Wethling, that the purported Minute to MAJ Simpkins, dated 15 June 2002, and before the court at exhibit 15, was not, in fact, placed on MAJ Simpkins’ desk on or about that date.”
23 The DFM then referred to Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 on the issue of lies being treated as consciousness of guilt. He proceeded to give himself a direction in general terms on the use of deliberate lies as evidence of guilt. Those directions are not open to criticism. He then concluded that the lie which he found the appellant had told, to the effect that the Minute of which exhibit 15 is a copy had been placed on Major Simpkins’ desk on about 15 June 2002, was a lie told out of a consciousness of guilt. The DFM then proceeded to use the lie as positive evidence of guilt.
24 The distinction between lies relevant only to credit and those which have the potential to provide positive evidence of guilt has been the subject of extensive judicial consideration, particularly since Edwards. In Edwards the nature of a lie disclosing consciousness of guilt was described in the following passage (at 210):
“A lie can constitute an admission against interest only if it is concerned with some circumstance or event connected with the offence (i.e. it relates to a material issue) and if it was told by the accused in circumstances in which the explanation for the lie is that he knew that the truth would implicate him in the offence. Thus, in any case where a lie is relied upon to prove guilt, the lie should be precisely identified, as should the circumstances and events that are said to indicate that it constitutes an admission against interest (See M v R (unreported; SA Court of Criminal Appeal; 18 August 1993; pp 4-5). And the jury should be instructed that they may take the lie into account only if they are satisfied, having regard to those circumstances and events, that it reveals a knowledge of the offence or some aspect of it (See, e.g. Credland v Knowler (1951), 35 Cr App R 48; Tripodi v The Queen (1961), 104 CLR 1, at 10; Reg v Buck (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 at 214; Reg v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647, at 650-651; Reg v Evans (1985) 38 SASR at 348-349; People v Showers (1968) 440 P 2d 939 at 942) and that it was told because the accused knew that the truth of the matter about which he lied would implicate him in the offence, or, as was said in Reg v Lucas (Ruth), because of ‘a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth’.”
25 The strict requirements which must be met for a lie to be used in this way were referred to by King CJ in Harris v The Queen (1990) 55 SASR 321 in a passage which emphasises the rarity of the circumstances in which those requirements are met, particularly in a situation where the accused is aware that he or she is under suspicion. The Chief Justice said (at 323):
“Lies told by an accused person either to the police or in the witness box are likely to have an adverse effect upon the credibility of the accused as a witness. But even the total discrediting of an accused as a witness is not a substitute for evidence of the commission of the crime charged. Generally speaking ‘a case in which an accused gives untruthful evidence is no different from one in which he gives no evidence at all’: see Broadhurst v The Queen [1964] AC 441 at 457, per Lord Devlin. In that case Lord Devlin warns against the ‘natural tendency for a jury to think that if an accused is lying, it must be because he is guilty’. The circumstances in which the accused’s lies will have an effect transcending mere damage to his credibility and will constitute positive evidence of the commission of the crime have been discussed in the context of corroboration in the cases of R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 and R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344. The probative character of some lies rises from their tendency to indicate that they proceed from a consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused. Instances of lies of that kind are false denials of having been in the company of an alleged victim at a material time or of having been at the scene of the crime at a relevant time, made at a time when the accused could not have known, unless he was the culprit, that there had been any wrongdoing in connection with the alleged victim or at the scene of the crime. Even in such cases courts must be on their guard against collateral motives for telling lies, such as the desire to conceal from a spouse that the accused was in the company of the alleged victim or was at the scene of the crime. The circumstances in which lies told after an accused becomes aware that he is or might be under suspicion in connection with the crime can amount to positive evidence of the commission of the crime must be rare. The tendency of persons under suspicion to wish to distance themselves from the persons or events connected with the alleged crimes and to endeavour to improve their position by falsehood is far too common to enable an inference to be drawn with confidence, in any but the rarest of cases, that lies proceed from a consciousness of guilt. Unjust results can easily flow from a readiness to treat lies of an accused person as positive evidence of guilt.”
26 There are many decisions which warn of the care which must be exercised before placing reliance on alleged lies to provide independent evidence of guilt: R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 at 701; R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 at 236 and R v Webb (1992) 59 SASR 563 at 577. In Sutton Street CJ commented (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 at 701:
“…reliance by the Crown on collateral conduct eloquent of guilt, such as flight or a lie, is fraught with the risk of miscarriage.”
27 In considering whether the alleged lie found by the DFM answers to the test of an implied admission of guilt, it is important to have regard to the precise finding which he made as to the content of the lie. Much of the cross-examination of the appellant was devoted to establishing that exhibit 15 was not a genuine document and that it was created for the purposes of the hearing before the DFM. However, it appears that the DFM was not prepared to make that finding. Instead, he restricted himself to concluding that the appellant lied in saying that a Minute in terms of exhibit 15 was delivered to Major Simpkins on or about 15 June 2002. This finding was clearly relevant to the credibility of the appellant. However, it is our view that the lie, if such it was, cannot be regarded as an implied admission of guilt.
28 The lie found by the DFM relates to a circumstance which was not part of the incident upon which the commission of the offence was based. The appellant said he placed exhibit 15 on Major Simpkins’ desk when he submitted his application for leave. This was a few days before he is alleged to have prepared the allegedly forged document exhibit 4. As has been pointed out, if the appellant had placed exhibit 15 on Major Simpkins’ desk at this time, it would have assisted his case in that, contrary to Major Simpkins’ evidence, the appellant was stating in the Minute that he had not yet been granted a franchise.
29 As we have pointed out, the DFM did not find that exhibit 15 was not a genuine document. He did not find that it was not prepared on or about 15 June 2002 which is the date it bears. The DFM found that the appellant told a lie when he said the Minute was placed on Major Simpkins’ desk on or about 15 June 2002. In the absence of any further finding the relevance of this lie is restricted to credibility. The circumstances of the lie do not amount to an implied admission to the offences: Edwards at 209. It is difficult to understand how the telling of the truth, namely that he did not deliver exhibit 15 to Major Simpkins, would implicate him in the commission of the offence. At the highest it could be inferred that the motive for the lie was to make the appellant’s case at the hearing appear stronger than it was, but this would not amount to an implied admission of guilt. It is our view that a positive inference of guilt in relation to the forgery and uttering offences cannot be inferred from the bare finding that the appellant told a lie in these circumstances.
30 There is a further difficulty in using the lie as indicating consciousness of guilt. A central feature of the case was the dispute between the versions of Major Simpkins and the appellant as to what was said by the appellant about the franchise. The DFM based his finding that the appellant lied about providing exhibit 15 to Major Simpkins on 15 June on Major Simpkins’ evidence and the cross-examination of the appellant. If it had been relevant to ask whether the lie could corroborate Major Simpkins’ evidence, the answer would have to be that it could not be corroborative because the evidence establishing the lie was not independent of Major Simpkins: Edwards at 208. It must be acknowledged that this was not a case in which corroboration was required as a matter of law. The evidence of the alleged lie was being used to affirmatively strengthen the prosecution case. However, caution is required in using a lie of the accused to provide support for a prosecution witness when the conclusion that it is a lie is based partly on the evidence of that witness and partly on the court’s view of the credibility of the accused.
31 The question remains whether the use of the alleged lie was productive of a substantial miscarriage of justice. After finding that the appellant had told a lie in this respect the DFM said:
I am satisfied that there was no reasonable possibility that the lie was told, other than on the basis of a realisation of guilt. Accordingly, this is a matter to which I shall have regard in aid of the other prosecution evidence. Of course, standing in isolation, it cannot prove guilt.
32 The finding in relation to the lie was not an essential step in the process of reasoning which led to the convictions. However, the influence of the unwarranted finding that there was independent proof of guilt by way of an implied admission in a case in which credibility was a significant consideration cannot be discounted. The use of the lie in this way played an important part in the reasoning process of the DFM. In our view this ground of appeal must be upheld.
33 Although this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, it is appropriate to deal with the other grounds of appeal. Ground 1 of the notice of appeal challenges the finding by the DFM that the appellant was guilty of charges which alleged that he was the principal offender.
34 The first charge alleged that the appellant created exhibit 4. The second charge alleged, in the alternative, that the appellant aided Corporal Greene in creating the document. The third charge alleged that the appellant procured the use of the forged document by requesting Corporal Greene to deliver it to Major Simpkins. The fourth charge, which was an alternative to the third charge, alleged that the appellant “used a document” by providing it to Corporal Greene and requesting her to give it to Major Simpkins.
35 In his reasons for decision the DFM commented on various alternative findings which might arise on the facts and the consequences of those findings. He said:
“In summary, if I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted as principal or as an accessory, then he must be acquitted. If I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he acted as principal, possibly through the intervention of an innocent agent, then he is guilty in that capacity. If I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he acted as accomplice to a complicit principle, then he is guilty of the principal offence by virtue of Commonwealth Criminal Code section 11.2, subject, of course, to all of the elements being established beyond reasonable doubt. The difficulty arises were I to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty either as principal or as accessory to a complicit principal, but cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his guilt arises as the one basis or the other.
In that case I regard the proper course to nonetheless be to bring in a verdict of guilty as principal. In other words, it is not necessary that I be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to whether he acted as principal, either with or without a complicit accomplice, or as an accomplice himself to a complicit principle, so long as I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of his complicity on either basis.”
36 Later in his reasons the DFM made the findings set out in para 17 of these reasons.
37 According to the argument of counsel for the appellant, a conclusion that the appellant was the principal offender was not open on the evidence and the findings which were made. The point raised was summarised in the appellant’s outline of submissions:
“The DFM could not be satisfied as to the precise role played by the appellant and on this basis, it is submitted, where there was such doubt as to the appellant’s role it was not open to the DFM to find the appellant guilty of the offences as the available evidence could not support a finding of guilt to the requisite standard.”
38 Section 11.2 of the Criminal Code relevantly provides:
“(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.
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(7) If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person either:
(a) is guilty of a particular offence otherwise than because of the operation of subsection (1); or
(b) is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1);
but is unable to determine which, the trier of fact may nonetheless find the person guilty of that offence.”
39 There is an analogy between a provision such as this and statutory provisions which address the situation where larceny and receiving or their equivalents are charged in the alternative. In the joint judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ in Gilson v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 353 at 363 their Honours said:
On the other hand, in Queensland and Western Australia the Criminal Codes provide that where stealing and receiving property are charged in the alternative and the jury find specially that the accused either stole the property or received it knowing it to be stolen, but are unable to say which of those offences was committed, the accused is not entitled to be acquitted, but the court shall enter a conviction of the offence for which the lesser punishment is provided: the Criminal Code (Q), s 568(4); Criminal Code (WA), s 586(4).
The Code provisions provide a satisfactory solution to the problem. It is clearly unsatisfactory to require a jury to acquit an accused entirely when they are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of either theft or receiving, merely because, as a result of being required to apply the same standard of proof, they cannot determine which offence he committed. The law must surely be brought into disrepute if it is so bereft of answers that an accused who is clearly guilty of one offence or the other is allowed to escape conviction altogether.
40 The majority of the High Court rejected the argument of the appellant that, at common law, the proper verdict in such circumstances should be a complete acquittal.
41 The Criminal Code specifically provides for the present situation and the appellant’s argument would render s 11.2(7) nugatory.
42 It is apparent that in relation to the charge laid under s 144.1 of the Criminal Code of making a false document the DFM was satisfied that the appellant either acted as a principal or that he aided and abetted Corporal Greene in making the document. In our view s 11.2(7) of the Criminal Code permits the approach adopted by the DFM.
43 In the case of the charges relating to the use of the document by Corporal Greene, the DFM was unable to determine whether Corporal Greene’s involvement was complicit. If Corporal Greene acted innocently, the appellant would have acted as a principal in the circumstances found by the DFM. If she was complicit then, again on the findings of the DFM, the appellant was an accessory. We are of the view that the finding that the appellant committed the offence in one capacity or the other attracts the operation of s 11.2 and permits the finding that the appellant committed the offence.
44 In our opinion the convictions cannot be challenged on the basis put forward in ground 1 of the notice of appeal.
45 The remaining grounds of appeal can be considered together. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the convictions were unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. In support of this argument it was contended that the DFM erred in the direction which he gave himself as to the weight which should be given to the evidence of Major Simpkins. It was submitted that it was not open to the DFM to find that exhibit 15 was not delivered to Major Simpkins. It was also submitted that it was not open to the DFM to accept the evidence of Major Simpkins beyond reasonable doubt in the light of the evidence of the appellant and Corporal Greene.
46 There were important conflicts in the respective accounts of Major Simpkins and the appellant. However, the DFM assessed the witnesses against the background of the evidence as a whole. He directed himself that disbelief of the appellant was insufficient by itself to establish an element of the offences charged and that each element of a particular charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before reaching a finding of guilt. Leaving aside the finding that the appellant told a lie which displayed consciousness of guilt, the manner in which the DFM assessed the evidence cannot be criticised. However, the ultimate decision in the case turned on the credibility of the witnesses and the conclusion that the appellant exhibited consciousness of guilt played an important role in the DFM’s reasoning. It is not open to this Tribunal to uphold the convictions on its own assessment of the evidence.
47 In our view, the appeal must be allowed on grounds 3 and 4 which complain of the finding that the alleged lie arose from a consciousness of guilt. The other grounds of appeal are dismissed. The convictions and punishment are set aside.
48 The Director of Military Prosecutions has conceded that there should be no order for a retrial. It is now five years since the occurrence of the events upon which the charges were based. In our view the concession is appropriate. There will be no order for a retrial.
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I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of Justice Heerey (President) and Justices Mildren & Duggan (Members). |
Associate:
Dated: 10 September 2007
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Counsel for the Appellant: |
T Berkley |
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Solicitor for the Appellant: |
Anthony S Biondo |
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Counsel for the Respondent: |
L McDade and J Gaynor |
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Solicitor for the Respondent: |
Director of Military Prosecutions |
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Date of Hearing: |
27 July 2007 |
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Date of Judgment: |
10 September 2007 |